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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
ROBERT L. NIX,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARTER BROTHERS SECURITY
SER\TTCES, LLC,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No. 2014-CV-253536

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF ROBERT L. NIX'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ALL OF DEFENDANT'S FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS
TIns matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Robert L. Nix's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on all of Defendant's Fraud and Misrepresentation Claims. Upon consideration of the
arguments of counsel, the evidence of record, and relevant case and statutory law, this COUli
finds as follows:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tills Action relates to a Stock Purchase Agreement ("SPA") executed on January 12,
20 14 (effective December 31, 20 l3), whereby Defendant Carter Brothers Security Services, LLC
("CBSS") purchased controlling interest in D & N Electric Company, Inc. ("D & N") from
Plaintiff Robert L. Nix ("Nix").
D & N is an electrical contractor and it performs work on construction projects. D & N
went through a period of financial difficulties and became involved in multiple lawsuits
beginning in 2012 and 2013. D & N was facing non-payment on two large projects totaling $10
million and the decline in revenue over these years was substantial. SunTrust, D & N's lender at
the time, placed D & N in "Special Assets" due to its financial problems and cut off its credit
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line. D & N bon-owed approximately $640,000 from its employees' retirement accounts in an
attempt to stay afloat. When self-financing proved to be ineffective, CBSS provided $500,000 in
September 2013 in exchange for 75 shares ofD & N common stock (a 7.5% interest) from Nix.
Following this cash infusion, CBSS's CEO, John Carter, entered into negotiations with D
& N's President, Matthew Armstrong, to acquire the controlling interest in D & N from Nix.
One of the conditions imposed on a potential deal was an immediate takeover of all of D & N's
finances. With this condition in place, D & Nand CBSS executed a Letter ofIntent ("LOI") on
November 15,2013.

The LOr established an Initial Purchase Price of$1.5 million followed by a

Contingent Purchase Price to be determined prior to the closing date based upon a set formula to
establish the value of D & N. It also called for a due diligence period. The due diligence team
included CBSS's former Senior Vice President of Operations Doug Smith, D & N's Controller
Joe Peterson, a Certified Public Accounting firm, and a law firm. According to Smith's
affidavit, he supervised CBSS's due diligence team and D & N's accounting team also worked at
his direction for nearly two months leading up to the SPA. As of November 21,2013,

CBSS had

control over D & N's bank accounts and all incoming money was going to CBSS controlled
accounts. Smith averred that CBSS "had essentially unfettered access to both historical and realtime, unfiltered, financial information from D & N's accounting database" which was reviewed
and discussed in detail with D & N's accounting team. Beginning in November of2013, Carter
negotiated directly with SunTrust regarding D & N's line of credit and moved D & N's insurance
and surety relationship to BB&T.
Nix, who was the majority shareholder of D & N before the SPA, is effectively blind and
had little involvement in the day-to-day operations of D & N for several years leading up to the
SPA. According to the affidavits of Smith, Armstrong, and Peterson, Nix was not involved in
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overseeing D & N's accounting or preparation of the financial statements and did not have

access to D & N's accounting software. Peterson avers that he never took instructions from Nix
about how D & N's accounting and finances would be conducted. Nix was not involved with
CBSS's due diligence. Smith avers that he did not consult with Nix regarding any of the details
that his due diligence team relied upon to determine whether CBSS should go forward with the
deal and that Nix made no representations to him that lie relied upon.
After Nix brought this lawsuit against CBSS for nonpayment of the Contingent Purchase
Price, CBSS filed counterclaims, I alleging Nix inflated D & N's value by overstating assets and
the value of ongoing litigation, inflating accounts receivable by presenting old receivables as
new, undervaluing costs, exaggerating the value of future projects, and concealing the extent of
self-dealing with related companies. CBSS also alleges that Nix and other D & N officers,
employees, and directors made various misrepresentations throughout their communications with
CBSS and used employee loans to inflate the balance ofD & N's operating account.
Nix argues that there is no evidence that he made any misrepresentations or concealed
information, knew or directed anyone to make misrepresentations or conceal information, or
intended to deceive CBSS. Instead, the evidence shows that CBSS had access to D & N's raw
financial data and accounting systems for two months leading up to the SPA and had actual
knowledge ofD & N's poor financial status, including knowledge regarding information they
now allege Nix misrepresented, such as the risk of the ongoing litigation and loans from
employees. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that either the due diligence team was aware

I CBSS timely filed its Answer and Counterclaims on January 8, 2015, and then subsequently filed its First
Amended Counterclaim on July 8, 2015, without seeking leave of Court, adding Georgia RICO claims and a breach
of fiduciary duty claim. This Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite its title, does not address counterclaims
raised in the initial Answer and Counterclaims.
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of the allegedly concealed information or they had access to more current, detailed information
than summary reports allegedly containing misrepresentations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." O.C.G.A.

§ 9-n-56(c).

"A defendant may do this by showing the court the documents,

affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient
to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff s case." Carpenter v. Sun

Valley Properties, LLC, 285 Ga. App. 1, 1-2 (2007); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829,
829 (1999).
To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A.
9-11-56( e). "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge" and
"shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." Id. The COUli views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 Ga. App.
653,654 (1996). "[M]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility [are] insufficient to preclude
summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Counterclaim 1: Violation of Georgia RICO
To prevail on a claim for violating Georgia's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), CBSS must show that Nix violated the RICO statute, that as a
result of this conduct CBSS suffered injury, and Nix's violation of the RICO statute was the
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§

proximate cause of the injury. Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2013).

RlCO makes it

"unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity ... , to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal
property of any nature, including money." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). To show a "pattern of
racketeering activity" a party must have committed two racketeering or predicate acts in
furtherance of the scheme as defined under the statute. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4)(A).

"A pattern is

defined as two or more similar incidents of criminal conduct." Perimeter Realty v. GAPf, Inc.,
243 Ga. App. 584,590

(2000). "A single transaction does not constitute a pattern of racketeering

activity." Id.
Here, CBSS alleges five predicate acts: (1) securities fraud under Georgia law, (2)
securities fraud under federal law, (3) mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), (4) wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §
1343), and (5) theft by deception (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3).

See O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5)

(listing state

predicate acts and incorporating federal predicate acts).
The elements of securities fraud under Georgia and federal law are similar. Under
federal law, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to "employ any
scheme or artifice to defraud" or "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading" ... "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."

17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5. Under Georgia law, a party must also show "1) a

misstatement or omission, 2) of a material fact, 3) made with scienter, 4) on which plaintiff
relied, 5) that proximately caused his injury." See GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph

Charles & Associates, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460,464

(2000); O.C.G.A. § 10-5-54. "Scienter must

be pleaded with particular facts that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a
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severely reckless manner." GCA Strategic at 464. "Severe recklessness is limited to those
highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." Id.
"Mail or wire fraud occurs when a person (1) intentionally participates in a scheme to
defraud another of money or property and (2) uses the mails or wires in furtherance of that
sclieme." Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88r.3d 902,906 n.8 (lIth Cir. 19-96) (citing

Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1498 (1Ith Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge
v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. §
1343.
Finally, theft by deception requires a showing that a person obtained property by
"deceitful means or artful practice" by intentionally creating a false impression, by failing to
correct a previously created false impression, by prohibiting another from acquiring pertinent
information, or by selling property without disclosing a substantial and valid known lien, adverse
claim, or other legal impediment.

See O.C.G.A.

§ 16-8-3 (a) & (b). "In order to commit the

crime of theft by deception, the defendant's deceptive act or false representation must have
induced the victim to part with his property." King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 311, 314 (1994).
'''Deceitful means' and 'artful practice' do not, however, include falsity as to matters having no
pecuniary significance, or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the
group addressed."

O.C.G.A.

§ 16-8-3(c).

The RICO counterclaim fails because CBSS has failed to present evidence that Nix had
the intent to deceive, a required element of each of the underlying predicate acts. "[A] failure to
show the level of intent needed for proving theft by deception would preclude a jury issue on that
crime as a predicate act for RICO purposes, defeating the RICO claim." Avery v. Chrysler
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Motors Corp., 214 Ga. App. 602, 604 (1994); see also Capital Constr.. Co. v. Prof Servo lnds.,

Inc., 258 Ga App. 44 (2002) (granting summary judgment on RICO counterclaim for lack of
specific evidence giving rise to triable issue with respect to intent to defraud).
CBSS argues that it has not yet deposed Nix and thus, the Court cannot consider the
Motion until Nix is deposed and CBSS has an opportunity to question him on his intent. CBSS's
counsel represented to the Court that the parties agreed to delay Nix's deposition until after a
scheduled mediation. The parties have tried and failed to mediate the case and yet Nix has not
been noticed for deposition. An adverse party to a motion for summary judgment may not rest
upon mere allegations in its pleading, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit or otherwise
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e).

CBSS, the adverse party here,

did not provide an affidavit stating reasons why CBSS could not present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition to the motion and did not request a continuance for more
discovery to be had pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f).
Management Order filed February 29,2016,

The Second Amended Case

was proposed jointly by the parties and ordered that

all fact witness depositions were to conclude on or before July 1,2016.

This Case Management

Order was entered after the parties reported several unsuccessful attempts to mediate but
acknowledged that they would continue to mediate. The Order required the parties to notify the
Court as to any dispute or problem that could delay the deadlines or hearing dates of this case.
The Court was never notified of any problem or dispute.

The undisputed evidence before the

Court is that Nix had no involvement with CBSS's due diligence or D & N's accounting. Simply
put, after adequate time for discovery, CBSS has not come forward with any evidence from
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which a jury could conclude that Nix had any intent to deceive, which is fatal to CBSS's RICO
claims.i
CBSS argues Nix's Motion should be denied because Smith is not a credible witness.
CBSS argues that a jury should be allowed to determine the credibility of this witness. See

Raven v. Dodd's Auto Sales & Serv., Inc., 117 Ga. App. 416, 421 (1968) ("When a witness shall
be successfully contradicted as to a material matter, his credit as to other matters shall be for the
jury."). Smith concluded in his affidavit that "[t]o the extent CBSS had unanswered questions
leading up to the execution of the SPA, it was the fault ofCBSS." However, in his deposition
testimony, Smith could not say whether Carter Brothers received a "full disclosure." The COUli
does not find these positions contradictory. Next, CBSS notes that Smith gave contradictory
testimony as to his enrollment in MBA level courses at University of Pennsylvania's Wharton
School of Business. CBSS produced a letter from Wharton noting they were unable to confirm
his attendance. Here, Smith's education is wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the claims raised.
Smith's testimony as to material facts is uncontroverted and is supported by other testimony.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim I for Violation of RICO
is GRANTED.
Further, there is no evidence that Nix made or directed any misrepresentation or concealment or
that any injury suffered by CBSS was proximately caused by any alleged misrepresentations or
concealments. The undisputed evidence in the case is that Nix was not involved in the due
diligence or preparation of the accounting reports. The due diligence team relied on raw
accounting data that was more current and detailed than the summary reports alleged to have
contained misrepresentations. See Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87 (2011) ("If
a party has access to information independent of the alleged misrepresentations, it generally
cannot show justifiable reliance."). Generally speaking, "[p ]roximate cause is properly reserved
for the jury and can only be appropriately addressed on summary judgment in plain and
indisputable cases." Greenwald v. Odom, 314 Ga. App. 46, 60 (20 12) (quoting Schernekau v.
McNabb, 220 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1996)). However, CBSS cannot rest on its allegations; it must
present evidence that CBSS's alleged injury-the purchase of the D & N stock for a higher value
than CBSS now thinks it is worth-was proximately caused by a misrepresentation or
concealment made by or directed by Nix. CBSS has failed to do so.
2

8

Count II: Conspiracy to Commit RICO Violation

"Under Georgia law, a person may be found liable for RICO conspiracy 'if they
knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy which itself contains a common plan or purpose to
commit two or more predicate acts.'"

Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165 (20 13) (citation

omitted). As discussed above, there is no evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact
that Nix was knowingly and willfully involved in misrepresenting or concealing information
from CBSS.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim II for Conspiracy to
Commit RICO Violation is GRANTED.
Count III: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Here, there is insufficient evidence to maintain a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
Nix as D & N's CEO by CBSS as a minority shareholder ofD & N. To survive summary
judgment, CBSS is required to present evidence of (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2)
breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga.
App. 377, 393 (2014). A fiduciary relationship exists where one party is "so situated as to
exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another" or where the law
requires utmost good faith. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58. In an arms-length negotiation for the purchase
of stock where each party is seeking to further their own separate business objectives, the parties
know their interests are adverse, and they are not involved in the transaction as partners or joint
ventures to achieve a common business objective, the courts have found that a fiduciary
relationship does not exist. See Kienel v. Lanier, 190 Ga. App. 201 (1989); Harish v. Raj,222
Ga. App. 248 (1996). However, a director is generally obligated "to make a full disclosure of all
material facts relative to the value of the property under his control, known to him and unknown
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to the stockholder [as buyer], where the sources of information are not equally accessible to both
parties." Gibbs v. Dodson, 229 Ga. App. 64, 66 (1997); see also Wright v. Apartment Inc., 315
Ga. App. 587,594 (2012).
In this case, CBSS fails to show evidence to support the existence of a fiduciary duty
with respect to the transaction at issue. There is no evidence that Nix had a controlling influence
over CBSS. The undisputed evidence instead shows that CBSS conducted two months of due
diligence, hired both an accountant and a law firm to assist, and had taken control over D & N's
accounting during this time period. The undisputed evidence is that Nix had no involvement in
D & N's operations for several years leading up to the SPA. He was not involved in the day-to
day accounting processes or due diligence. The undisputed testimony is that CBSS had greater
access to D & N's accounting records than Nix. Finally, even if Nix owed CBSS full disclosure,
there is no evidence, as discussed above, that Nix concealed any material fact, i.e., breached his
duty. Thus, there is no evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that Nix breached
any fiduciary duty to CBSS.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Counterclaim III for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this

rt-tay

of August, 2016.
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